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Abstract— Creating complex systems by combining smaller 
component services is one of the fundamental concepts in 
Service Oriented Architecture. Service compositions are built 
by combining loosely coupled services that are, usually, offered 
and operated by different service providers. While this 
approach offers several benefits, it makes the implementation 
and representation of the security requirements difficult. This 
paper reviews several requirement specification languages and 
analyses their suitability for composite services. A set of 
requirements is identified and a comparison between different 
specification languages is presented along with some 
conclusion on the suitability of each language in expressing 
security requirements for composite services. 
Keywords- policy languages; composite services; security; 
service-oriented computing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Service-based applications are a new class of software 
systems that allow enterprises to offer their software 
systems as services by following the principal of Service 
Oriented Architectures (SOA). A service itself is a unit that 
offers certain functionality. If no single service can satisfy 
the functionality required by the user, then SOA allows 
multiple services to be composed to form a larger 
application in order to fulfil the user requirements. A SOA 
platform provides a foundation for modelling and 
composing multiple services in an ad hoc manner [1] [2].  
Aniketos is an EU research project [3] that addresses 
trustworthy and secure service compositions with run-time 
monitoring and adaptation of services. One important task in 
the Aniketos project is to choose a specification language 
that is able to express security requirements, properties or 
policies for composite services. Also, it is a suitable policy 
language to specify what we need to monitor at runtime. 
Besides, the specifications should be able to be generated by 
both humans and software. In general, this language should 
serve to other purposes as well, e.g., it should specify the 
security requirements for a service (either desired by a 
consumer or advertised by a service provider). Naturally, we 
may use one language for requirements specification and 
another one for monitoring these requirements, but then 
there is a need for a transformation engine. Thus, one 
language for both purposes significantly reduces the 
complexity.  
This paper reviews several security requirement 
specification languages and analyses their suitability for a 
modern, flexible, secure service platform. A set of 
requirements is identified and a comparison between 
different specification languages is presented along with 
some conclusion on the suitability of each language in 
expressing security requirements for services that are 
composite in nature. We use the Aniketos Platform as a 
reference point to discuss these languages and there 
suitability for composite services.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section 
presents the requirements for a specification language. 
Specification languages are discussed in Section 3. The 
suitability of the language ConSpec for the project Aniketos 
is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the conclusion 
on specification language choice. 
II. SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES REQUIREMENTS 
In the context of the Aniketos Platform development, we 
are mainly looking for specification languages which are 
able to address the following requirements. The selected list 
of requirements is a result of analysis that has been carried 
out on more than fifty scenarios coming from three different 
domains (air traffic management, telecommunication and e-
government) [4] [5].  
 (Rec-01) Cross-composite- The language for contract 
specification shall be able to express the properties for a 
hierarchical service. It should support both atomic and 
composite services. Complex services often have a 
complex hierarchical structure. Thus, the contract 
specification language should be able to describe the 
desired and provided properties, taking into account that 
some parts of the service are provided by the services at 
the lower end of the hierarchy.  
 (Rec-02) Generalizable and Unambiguous- The language 
for contract specification shall be general enough to 
express requirements of various kinds. Security 
requirements, which one would like to express with the 
language could be very different. These requirements 
may include presence of some countermeasures, various 
access control policies, well-known security properties, 
or a numerical security target (e.g., Risk level). 
 (Rec-03) Intelligible- There shall be no difference 
whether the set of policies is created by a human or 
software. The language should be easily interpretable 
both by humans and through automated means.  
TABLE 1: CONTRACT/POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Rec-01-
01 
The specification language should be able to express 
the scope of the policies to determine if it applies to a 
single or multiple executions of the same service. 
Rec-02-
01 
The specification language should have unambiguous 
and restricted semantics to improve its clarity and 
simplicity. 
Rec-02-
02 
The specification language should be able to 
represent state transitions. 
Rec-03-
01 
The specifications should be able to be developed for 
integration with computer programs, i.e., Java. 
Rec-03-
02 
The learning of the language should not require too 
much technical training in order to be able to express 
new requirements, properties or policies. 
We could make these requirements even more specific as 
listed in Table 1. 
III. SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES 
In the literature, we can find a huge amount of work on 
policy specification languages as well as several taxonomies 
of these languages. We will start discussing some of these 
existing classifications that will help us in the search for a 
suitable specification language to be used in Aniketos and to 
choose the main potential candidate languages. 
First, Bonatti et al. [6] differentiate the following groups 
of rule-based policy specifications performed by the 
REWERSE (Reasoning on the Web with Rules and 
Semantics) Project [7]. They differentiate the following 
groups of rule-based policy specifications: 
1) Logic-based policy languages: focused on those 
languages with unambiguous semantics that enhance 
clarity, simplicity and modularity. The main advantages 
of these logic languages are: (i) they are very suitable 
for validation and verification; (ii) their declarative 
nature makes them expressive enough to formulate a 
wide range of policies with simplicity.In this category 
we find for example the eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML) that is the standard for 
policy specification developed by the OASIS 
consortium. 
2) Action languages: including those languages that can 
be used to represent actions, changes and their effects. 
Most of them describe dynamic situations according to 
a so-called state-action model. One of the most popular 
logic-based approaches of action languages is 
EventCalculus. 
3) Business rules: based on those languages that are more 
concerned in the formulation of statements about how a 
business must be done or in other words, the guidelines 
and restrictions that apply to states and processes in an 
organization. They distinguish here three categories of 
rules: reaction rules (“ON event IF condition is fulfilled 
THEN perform action”), derivation rules (each rule 
expresses the knowledge that if one set of statements 
happens to be true, then some other set of statements 
must also be or become true) and integrity constraints 
(assertions that must be satisfied in all evolving states). 
One of the more relevant business process description 
languages is the Business Process Execution Language 
for Web Services (BPEL4WS). 
4) Controlled natural languages: which are defined like 
“subsets of natural languages whose grammars and 
dictionaries have been restricted in order to reduce or 
eliminate both ambiguity and complexity”. Therefore, 
this category would be included in what it is called 
“semantic languages”. An example is PROTUNE that is 
the name of the policy language and meta-language 
developed in the REWERSE Project. 
     To summarize, from the analysis performed by 
REWERSE, we select the following potential languages for 
a further study taking into consideration the requirements 
indicated above for Aniketos: 
 XACML  
 Event Calculus 
 Web Service Description Language (WSDL) 
/BPEL4WS 
 PROTUNE (and other relevant semantic web 
languages) 
     In the PrimeLife Project [8], they define three types of 
policies that they considered important parts of any privacy 
policy that have to be covered by any policy language: (i) 
data handling; (ii) access control; and (iii) trust policies. The 
languages selected from the PrimeLife study are: 
 XACML  
 The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
     Finally, we are going to analyse the Contract 
Specification Language (ConSpec) that is an automata-
based policy specification language presented in the 
literature [9] as a potential language for specifying both 
policies and contracts in various security enforcement 
related tasks of the application lifecycle. 
     In the next subsections, we discuss in more detail each 
one of the selected policy languages that we have 
considered as candidates in Aniketos. 
A. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language  
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
[22] is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based 
language used to express and interchange access control 
policies. It is designed to express authorization policies in 
XML against objects that are themselves identified in XML. 
XACML is a general purpose policy language and it can be 
used to protect any resource type (i.e., not just data), but it is 
difficult to write XACML policies and even more difficult 
to reason over (i.e., it is unsatisfactory regarding 
requirement Rec-03-02). Therefore we could use this 
language in Aniketos project since it would allow encoding 
most of security properties that will be included into the 
Contract (requirement Rec-01), but we would need to 
"misuse" the constraint part of XACML policies since 
XACML is tailored towards Access Control policies.  
B. Event Calculus  
Event Calculus (EC) [10] is a first-order temporal 
logical language for representing actions and their effects 
that can be used to specify properties of dynamic systems, 
which change over time. Such properties are specified in 
terms of events and fluents. An event in EC is something 
that occurs at a specific instance of time (e.g., invocation of 
an operation) and may change the state of a system. Fluents 
are conditions regarding the state of a system, which are 
initiated and terminated by events. A fluent may, for 
example, signify that a specific system variable has a 
particular value at a specific instance of time or that a 
specific relation between two objects holds. 
ecXML [11] is an XML formalisation of the Event 
Calculus that is used to describe how a contract’s state 
evolves, according to events that are described in the 
contract. The main advantage of this language for Aniketos 
is that it is very suitable for runtime monitoring and can be 
used to represent properties, policies and contracts in a 
dynamic environment (Rec-01). But it is more oriented 
towards states and actions than services, and the syntax 
could become too complicated for compound services and 
expression of hierarchies (Rec-02). Moreover, it would 
require a big effort to accomplish requirement Rec-03 to 
automate the generation and runtime monitoring of these 
rules in Java code. 
C. Web Service Definition Language / Business Process 
Execution Language for Web Services 
The WSDL [12] is the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) standard language for web service descriptions. It is 
an XML format used to create a flexible Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) for web services defining mutual 
understandings and expectations of a service between the 
service provider and service consumers. It uses a very 
limited syntax that defines services as collections of 
network endpoints or ports.  
The Business Process Execution Language for Web 
Services (BPEL4WS) [13] is a language used for specifying 
business process behaviour based on Web Services, which 
was created to overcome the limits of WSDL. It allows 
building definitions of a business process (that can be either 
an executable itself or a business protocol) where both the 
process and its partners are modelled as WSDL services.  
The language is layered on top of several XML 
specifications (WSDL 1.1, XML Schema 1.0, and 
XPath1.0) but makes no use of semantic information.  
This language is a service-oriented composition 
language that forms the base of Aniketos, but we want to 
express also security properties and trustworthiness (Rec-
01). Consequently we need something that provides more 
information than BPEL4WS. 
D. PROVisional TrUst Negotiation  
PROvisional TrUst Negotiation (PROTUNE) [14] is a 
natural language for the specification of rule based policies 
on the semantic web defined by REWERSE [7]. It is a 
logic-based and declarative policy language that includes 
logical axioms to constrain the behaviour and how the web 
resources must be used. But the main feature of PROTUNE 
that makes it different from the previously discussed 
languages is that it is a semantic web language.  
The semantic web languages are developed to allow 
intelligent agents in the semantic web to reason and make 
decisions policy-driven based on the knowledge it is 
provided by the semantics. Therefore, one of the main 
advantages of these semantic web languages for Aniketos is 
that it facilitates greater automatic machine interpretability 
of conditions, taking decisions and performing tasks 
(covering the requirement Rec-03). Besides, this kind of 
language provides an enormous expressivity and can be 
used to represent complex knowledge in a distributed 
environment and support classification in hierarchies 
(requirements Rec-01 and Rec-02). But this last feature is 
also a big drawback (high complexity) due to which it 
cannot be considered in the project Aniketos. Reasoning 
with a semantic web language is difficult and it requires a 
well-defined semantic that should be developed specifically 
for Aniketos. Furthermore, its high expressiveness can lead 
to non-standard formalism and sometimes to complexity in 
the reasoning. 
The semantic web languages standardized by the W3C 
are (i) Resource Description Framework (RDF) [15] and (ii) 
Web Ontology Language (OWL) [16].  
OWL includes more vocabulary and consequently 
extends the facilities offered by XML, RDF and RDF 
Schema (RDF-S) for expressing meaning and semantics 
what makes it easier to represent machine interpretable 
content on the Web. In turn, OWL provides three 
increasingly expressive sublanguages: OWL Lite, OWL 
Description Logic (OWL DL), and OWL Full.  
In the case of PROTUNE, the syntax is based on normal 
logic program rules. Finally, we can take into consideration 
two prominent semantic web languages based on OWL, 
which appear in much of the literature: Rei and KAoS 
[17][18]. Rei is a policy language based on OWL-Lite that 
includes logic-like variables to provide more flexibility in 
the specification of relationships that are not possible in 
OWL. For example, it is possible to define individual and 
group based policies that could be useful in large scale 
distributed environments for saving time. They are 
associated with agents, called subjects, by means of the has 
construct: has(Subject, PolicyObject). 
KAoS is another policy language based on OWL with 
the following distinguishing features: (i) it does not assume 
that the policies are applied in homogeneous components: 
(ii) it supports dynamic runtime policy changes; (iii) the 
framework is extensible to different execution platforms; 
(iv) the KAoS framework is intended to be robust and 
adaptable in continuing to manage and enforce the policy of 
any combination of components. 
E. Platform for Privacy Preferences 
The P3P [19], published by the W3C, enables web sites 
to express their privacy practices in a standard format that 
can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user 
agents. P3P user agents will allow users to be informed of 
site practices (in both machine and human readable formats) 
and to automate decision-making based on these practices 
when appropriate. But this option has been discarded for 
Aniketos because a report [20] on the assessment of P3P 
and Internet privacy finds that P3P fails to comply with 
baseline standards for privacy protection. It is a complex 
and confusing protocol that also fails to address many of the 
privacy problems. The report concludes that there is little 
evidence to support the industry claim that P3P will 
improve user privacy citing the widely accepted Fair 
Information Practices.   
F. ConSpec Language 
The ConSpec [9] language with its syntax shown in Fig. 
1 is strongly inspired by the policy specification language 
PSLang, which was developed by Erlingsson and Schneider 
in [21] for runtime monitoring. However, even though 
ConSpec is a more restricted language than PSLang, it is 
expressive enough to write policies referring to multiple 
executions of the same application, as well as to executions 
of all applications of a system, in addition to policies about 
a single execution of the application and of a certain class 
object lifetime according to the scope of the policy.  
Effectively, a ConSpec contract specifies a set of guards 
each with an associated set of reactions. A guard is defined 
as a method prototype. A reaction is a set of expressions 
specifying state changes, where the left hand side specifies 
the state before and the right hand side the state afterwards. 
Whenever the guard method is called in the code, the state 
expression is checked and, if the left hand side of the 
expression matches the current state, the right hand side 
expression is applied to update it. In the event that the state 
fails to match any of the left hand side expressions, the 
contract is considered to be violated. The following example 
states that, once the file Secret.dat has been opened, 
plaintext socket connections can no longer be used. Note 
that the skip keyword is used to represent no state change. 
 
Figure 1. Syntax of ConSpec 
One of the attractive features of this approach is that the 
use of a finite state machine coupled with guards defined 
against explicit methods means that the ConSpec script 
defines not just the policy but also the means to identify it. 
However, we can also see from the above example that 
ConSpec was originally developed for use with single 
isolated pieces of software, written in a specific language (in 
the case of the Aniketos project, this is Java). This impacts 
the cross-composite requirements. 
The language has therefore been extended to support 
composed services [1][2]. This can be achieved in one of 
two ways. First, a single ConSpec file can be defined to 
apply across a set of composed services. This requires there 
to be a single centrally managed finite automata state 
machine that all guard events refer back to. In this case, 
rather than specifying methods for the guards, a service 
identifier must also be specified. Service identifiers can also 
be passed as a parameter to the reaction, so that the state 
change can be predicated on service properties as well. In 
this case, earlier guards that identify particular functionality 
in a particular service can be used to correlate with guards 
identifying different functionality at a later time. It also 
allows more flexibility in defining contracts, since ideally 
the contract should be independent of the service 
composition that its applied to. Second, each service can be 
given its own ConSpec file. In this case there’s effectively 
an automaton applied to each service. However, there needs 
to be correlation between the services, so a further central 
BEFORE File.Open(String path) PERFORM 
     path == "Secret.dat" -> {private = true;} 
 
BEFORE Socket.Send(String sd, String data) 
PERFORM 
     private == false -> {skip;} 
automaton is needed at the composition level. State changes 
at the service level generate events, which are then matched 
against guards at the composition level which potentially 
update the central automaton. An attractive feature of using 
finite automata is that they are themselves compositional: 
this arrangement is equivalent to a finite automaton applied 
across all services. This allows cross-composition.  
The policies written in ConSpec are easily interpretable 
by humans. It has a comparatively simple semantics, and is 
simple to learn. ConSpec is an automata-based language. 
Although this feature slightly reduces its expressiveness (in 
comparison with its predecessor PSLan [21], or other 
declarative languages as EventCalculus [10], XACML [22], 
PROTUNE [14], etc.), it allows automatic reasoning on it. 
For example, in the project we needed to check that 
requirements desired by a consumer could be fulfilled by a 
service provider. Furthermore, it is simple to define a policy 
decision point for monitoring purposes if an automaton is 
available. Finally, ConSpec defines different scopes of its 
application. Thus, we may define a policy for a single 
execution of a service or multiple executions. Overall, 
ConSpec provides an unambiguous, cross-composite and 
intelligible approach, which makes it a more suitable 
specification language for composite services.  
IV. CONSPEC IN THE ANIKETOS PROJECT 
Based on the above analysis, we selected the ConSpec 
language as a specification language for the Aniketos 
platform and extended it (as discussed above) to support the 
composite nature of services.  In the scope of the Aniketos 
project, we have created a tool, which provides a graphical 
user interface for making and changing ConSpec policies. 
The tool is called a ConSpec Editor illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2. ConSpec editor 
     ConSpec policies can be created with the ConSpec Editor 
without knowing the ConSpec language. As an example, the 
ConSpec policies are used by a monitoring module 
developed as a part of the Aniketos project. The monitoring 
module is responsible for the runtime monitoring of a 
service to ensure that the service behaves in compliance 
with a pre-defined security policy. For more details about 
the monitoring framework, see [2].   
     Consider the following example where a service designer 
creates a travel booking composition that consists of several 
tasks, such as ordering, booking hotel, booking flight, 
payment and invoice, and each task is performed by a 
component service. The service designer might want that the 
payment service component should only be invoked when it 
has a trustworthiness value ≥ 90%. This requirement could 
easily be specified using the ConSpec language as shown in 
Fig. 3. 
 
RULE ID Trustworthiness 
SECURITY STATE 
    String ServiceID=Payment; 
 int trust_threshold = 90; 
 /* assume trustworthiness is in [0%,..., 100%]*/ 
 
BEFORE invoke (serviceID) 
PERFORM 
 (eval_Trust(serviceID) >= trust_threshold) -> skip 
                                 condition1 -> update 
Figure 3. ConSpec policy example 1 
     The monitoring module in adherence to the policy 
monitors services to ensure that only a payment service with 
trustworthiness value ≥ 90% is used. In another example, 
where a service designer imposes the separation of duty 
constraint for a particular service composition, i.e., both 
service A and service B should be offered by different 
providers.  
RULE ID SoD_Goal 
SECURITY STATE 
string serviceProvider = _; 
string guardedTask1 = ServiceA; 
string guardedTask2 = ServiceB; 
 
BEFORE v#service.start 
(string id, string type, int time, int date, 
string provider) PERFORM 
(id == guardedTask1 || id == guardedTask2) && 
serviceProvider == "_" -> {serviceProvider = 
provider; } 
(id == guardedTask1 || id == guardedTask2) && 
!(serviceProvider == "_") && !(provider == 
serviceProvider) -> {skip} 
!(id == guardedTask1) && !(id == guardedTask2) 
-> {skip} 
Figure 4 . ConSpec policy example 2 
The requirement for the above example can be specified 
in ConSpec as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
V. CONCLUSION ON SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE CHOICE 
The different languages discussed here exhibit interesting 
properties in relation to their suitability for composite 
service. However, comparing the requirements and needs 
that the Aniketos platform requires to express security 
policies and the previous descriptions of the different 
languages, we can conclude that ConSpec is the best solution 
for the main reasons summarized below: 
 It is extended to offer unambiguous, cross-composite 
solutions with important elements of generalizability 
for composite services. 
 It is developed as a language for representing security 
relevant behaviours of an application in terms of Java 
calls, which allows the rules to be generated and 
checked at runtime also by software or security 
automata.  
 A policy written in the ConSpec language is easily 
interpretable by humans and the simplicity of the 
language allows a comparatively simple semantics and 
a reasonably fast learning curve. 
 Although ConSpec does not allow any arbitrary type to 
represent the security state of a service, it includes tags 
for expressing security requirements in different stages 
of the application life cycle. It makes it possible to 
indicate constraints that can be applied to multiple 
executions of a service, as well as interactions with 
other services. 
 
TABLE 2. MATCHING OF SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES TO REQUIREMENTS 
 
    Table 2 summarizes the requirements that are covered by 
each of the different languages presented above. 
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